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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






THOMAS R. WHITTAKER; CHRISTY L. WHITTAKER; EDNA J. HAMILTON, 
as Executrix of the Estate of David C. Hamilton,  
 




COUNTY OF LAWRENCE; TOWNSHIP OF NESHANNOCK;  
LAWRENCE COUNTY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; 
REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF LAWRENCE COUNTY;  
STEVE J. CRAIG; DANIEL J. VOGLER; FRANK TELESZ; JAMES GAGLIANO, JR.; 
DENNIS F. ALDUK; JOSEPH CAMINITI; RYAN KEGEL; JON NATALE;  
GALE E. MEASEL, JR.; ROBERT DEL SIGNORE, SR.; LINDA NITCH 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:04-cv-1092) 
District Judge:  Hon. Nora Berry Fischer 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 13, 2011 
 
Before:  SMITH, CHAGARES, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 












 Thomas Whittaker, Christy Whittaker, and Edna Hamilton (the “Property 
Owners”) appeal from the District Court‟s dismissal of their case.  For the reasons set 
forth below, we will affirm. 
I. 
 Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly recite 
the facts.  The Property Owners all owned parcels of property within “Millennium Park,” 
an area of approximately 530 acres that had been identified for industrial development by 
the Lawrence County Economic Development Corporation (“LCEDC”), which is a 
private non-profit corporation formed by Lawrence County.  When a potential buyer 
became interested in the Property Owners‟ land, the LCEDC attempted to purchase the 
property.  These negotiations were unsuccessful, and the County then created the 
Redevelopment Authority of Lawrence County (“RALC”), which had the authority to 
condemn property.  Declarations of Taking were filed in the Lawrence County Court of 
Common Pleas against the Property Owners‟ parcels on July 29, 2004. 
 Knowing that the condemnation of their property was imminent, the Whittakers 
filed an action in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on July 23, 2004, and Hamilton 
filed a similar action on July 27, 2004.  The defendants filed motions to dismiss these 
cases, but the District Court stayed these actions pending the outcome of the eminent 
domain proceedings in Pennsylvania state court as well as the United States Supreme 
Court‟s decision in Kelo v. City of New London.  The Whittakers subsequently filed a 
second suit naming additional defendants, and that action was consolidated with their 
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previous action and the Hamilton suit in August of 2005.  On October 15, 2007, the 
District Court lifted the stay on the federal action and ordered that a single amended 
complaint be filed, containing all of the parties‟ allegations.  The case was then stayed 
again pending the outcome of the Pennsylvania adjudication of the takings.   
 On December 22, 2008, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, sitting en banc, 
concluded that the RALC improperly condemned the property at issue.  The District 
Court reopened the case, and a renewed motion to dismiss was filed.  The District Court 
granted the motion on December 7, 2009, concluding that the Property Owners had failed 
to state a claim on any of their federal causes of action, and declining to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.  The instant appeal 
followed. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 
and 1367, and this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise de novo 
review of a District Court‟s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008). 
III. 
 The majority of the Property Owners‟ argument focuses on their contention that 
the District Court erred in reading Kelo as providing a national standard for what 
constitutes a “public use” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment‟s takings clause.  The 
Fifth Amendment‟s takings clause provides “nor shall property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation,” and the Property Owners argue that in determining whether 
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something constitutes a public use, we must look to state law on the subject.  They rely 
heavily on the fact that the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, in In re Condemnation 
by Redevelopment Authority of Lawrence County, 962 A.2d 1257 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2008), held that Pennsylvania law does not permit eminent domain to be used to foster 
economic development.  According to the Property Owners‟ reading of Kelo, the Fifth 
Amendment permits economic development to constitute a public use, but courts should 
look to state law to determine whether that state has made such a use a public use.  We 
disagree. 
 The question facing the Supreme Court in Kelo was whether the Fifth 
Amendment‟s takings clause permitted economic development to constitute a public use.  
The Court concluded that economic development could constitute a public use, stating 
that “[p]romoting economic development is a traditional and long-accepted function of 
government.”  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005).  The Court went 
on to “emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further 
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power,” and noted that “[t]his Court‟s authority . 
. . extends only to determining whether the City‟s proposed condemnations are for a 
„public use‟ within the meaning of the Fifth amendment to the Federal Constitution.”  Id. 
at 489-90.   
 We do not believe that this language requires that we look to what limitations 
various states impose on their own eminent domain powers to determine whether the 
taking at issue violates the Fifth Amendment.  Instead, we find the Court‟s statement in 
Kelo to be clear:  a taking for purposes of economic development satisfies the Fifth 
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Amendment‟s public use requirement.  Were we to accept the Property Owners‟ 
argument and allow states to define what constitutes a public use for purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment, we would be permitting the states to limit not only their own actions, but 
also the ability of the federal government to exercise its eminent domain power.  Rather 
than doing this, we will take Kelo at its face value, and interpret it as providing a federal 
constitutional floor for the definition of a public use that allows states to build upon this 
floor should they choose to do so.  Although we need not resolve the question of whether 
the conduct in this case violated Pennsylvania‟s state laws or constitution, we do hold 
that such conduct does not violate the Federal Constitution and we will affirm the District 
Court‟s dismissal of the Property Owners‟ Fifth Amendment takings claim.    
 The Property Owners next argue that the District Court erred in dismissing their 
substantive due process claim.  In reviewing the conduct of executive officials, only 
conduct that “shocks the conscience” rises to the level of a substantive due process 
violation.  County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).  Whether conduct 
shocks the conscience is a question of law for the court to decide.  Benn v. Universal 
Health Sys., Inc., 371 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2004).  The Property Owners assert that the 
Lawrence County Commissioners authorized the use of eminent domain power despite 
no indication of blight, as required by Pennsylvania‟s Urban Redevelopment Law, and 
that this deliberate misuse of state authority shocks the conscience.     
 In dismissing this claim, the District Court appears to have relied on the fact that 
there was no conduct alleged that violated the Federal Constitution, and this Court‟s 
statement that “„[a] bad-faith violation of state law remains only a violation of state 
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law.‟”  Appendix (“App.”) 51 (quoting United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of 
Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 402 (3d Cir. 2003)).  We agree with the policy embodied in 
that statement, even if the District Court slightly overstated the principal.  First, an 
underlying constitutional violation is not required to state a substantive due process 
claim, and some violations of state law may “shock the conscience.”  This, however, does 
not mean that every violation of state law is “constitutionalized” through the application 
of the substantive due process clause, and the District Court was properly concerned with 
preventing this provision from turning into a broad authorization to review state actors‟ 
compliance with state law.  On several occasions, this Court has implied that a violation 
of state law will constitute conscience shocking behavior when it contains “allegations of 
corruption, self-dealing, bias against an ethnic group, or additional facts that suggest[] 
conscience-shocking behavior.”  Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 220 (3d Cir. 2008); see 
also Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 286 (3d Cir. 2004).  In other 
words, a state official‟s failure to follow state law does not, by itself, shock the 
conscience in the absence of additional facts.  No such additional facts are presented in 
this case; instead, the Property Owners simply allege that the defendants did not follow 
state law in taking their property.  While this certainly is not conduct without a remedy, 
the remedy is not provided by the Federal Constitution‟s substantive due process clause.  
For this reason, we will affirm the District Court‟s dismissal of the substantive due 
process claim.    
 The Property Owners also allege that the District Court erred in dismissing their 
equal protection claims.  In bringing this claim, they proceeded as a “class of one,” 
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arguing that the action in this case amounted to “intentional and arbitrary discrimination” 
without a rational basis.  Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).  The Property 
Owners assert that because the property was not blighted, there was no legitimate 
government interest in exercising eminent domain over the property and that the 
defendants acted irrationally in condemning it. 
 We again disagree with the Property Owners‟ argument.  Much as the Federal 
Constitution‟s definition of public use does not depend on state law, we do not refer to 
state law in establishing whether the government has a legitimate interest in taking the 
property.  States have a legitimate government interest in exercising their eminent 
domain power for the public use, which, for purposes of the Federal Constitution, 
includes economic development, as discussed above.  The Property Owners‟ argument 
that there was no legitimate government interest in this case, therefore, is without merit.  
Further, there was no arbitrary singling out of the properties in question in the present 
case.  Instead, the properties were chosen because they were the only properties not 
purchased within the Millennium Park area, meaning that all similarly situated 
individuals were treated similarly in this case.  In sum, the state action both advanced a 
legitimate government interest and was not discriminatory.  That state law may place 
further limitations on the use of eminent domain power does not cause a federal equal 
protection problem, and we will affirm the District Court‟s dismissal. 
 The Property Owners also find error in the District Court‟s treatment of their 
conspiracy claims, its discussion of qualified immunity, and its dismissal of their state 
law claims.  Because we have not found any underlying error in the District Court‟s 
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treatment of the substantive claims, however, we need not address any of the Property 
Owners‟ arguments on these issues.  A conspiracy to engage in conduct that does not 
amount to a constitutional violation is not a violation of § 1983, and no immunity is 
necessary if there was no unconstitutional act.  Further, as we agree that all of the federal 
claims were properly dismissed, the District Court did not err in declining to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).  We 
will, therefore, affirm the District Court‟s treatment of all of these issues as well. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
 
